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The object of this paper is to look at the extent and nature of the uses of anal-
ogy during the ªrst century following the so-called scientiªc revolution.
Using the research tool provided by JSTOR we systematically analyze the
uses of “analog” and its cognates (analogies, analogous, etc.) in the Philo-
sophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London for the period 1665–
1780. In addition to giving the possibility of evaluating quantitatively the
proportion of papers explicitly using analogies, this approach makes it possi-
ble to go beyond the maybe idiosyncratic cases of Descartes, Kepler, Galileo,
and other much studied giants of the so-called Scientiªc Revolution. As a re-
sult a classiªcation of types of uses is proposed. Relations between types of
analogies and research ªelds are also established. In this paper we are less in-
terested in discussing the “real nature” or “essence” or even the cognitive limi-
tations of analogical thinking than in describing its various uses and differ-
ent meanings as they changed over the course of a century.
1. Introduction
The uses of analogy are ancient. It can even be argued that analogical
thinking is the most basic cognitive tool humans have to move from the
unknown to the known (Gentner et al. 2001). As Olson succinctly puts it,
“analogies are useful when it is desired to compare an unfamiliar system
with one that is better known” (Olson 1943, p. i). Analogical thinking is
1. The authors would like to thank the referees for their useful comments and sugges-
tions.
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thus ubiquitous and found in many texts at least since Homer in Antiq-
uity (Lloyd 1966). For example, it is well known that to explain the prop-
erties of atoms, Aristotle compared them to the letters of alphabets, some-
thing much better known to his readers than invisible atoms (Hallyn
2000).
Many studies have looked at particular uses of analogies among the ma-
jor actors in the emergence of modern science at the beginning of the 17th
century (see for example Daston 1984; Galison 1984; Shea 2000; Simon
2000). The object of this paper is not to add another name to that list but
to describe more generally the various uses that have been made of analo-
gies in 17th and 18th century science (before the emergence of distinct
scientiªc disciplines) among general scientiªc practitioners who published
their results in the journal of the Royal Society of London. By looking at
the presence of the word “analogy” and its cognates “analogical,” “analo-
gous,” “analogue,” in all the papers published in the Philosophical Transac-
tions of the Royal Society of London (hereafter PT) from its beginnings in
1665 to 1780, we can assess the spread of analogical thinking among the
“rank and ªle” of the scientiªc ªeld during the period covered. We are
thus interested in the taken-for-granted practices of the natural philoso-
phers who made the results of their inquiries into nature known through
the venue of one of the ªrst scientiªc journals. Our approach takes advan-
tage of the access to full texts and search engine now accessible through
JSTOR. In addition to giving the possibility of evaluating quantitatively
the proportion of papers explicitly using analogies, this approach makes it
possible to go beyond the maybe idiosyncratic cases of Descartes, Kepler,
Galileo, and other much studied giants of the so-called Scientiªc Revolu-
tion. For despite the frequent use of the expression “scientiªc community”
we have in fact few tools for really taking it as an object of inquiry. The
method used here provides us with such a possibility.
We should also stress that we are less interested in discussing the “real
nature” or “essence” or even the cognitive limitations of analogical think-
ing much discussed in philosophy of science than in describing its various
uses and different meanings as they changed over the course of a century.
In order to do this we distinguish two levels: the ªrst is that of the practi-
cal use of an analogy between two systems, which philosophers of science
often call the “source” and the “target” of the analogy (Holyoak & Tha-
gard 1995). At this practical and taken-for-granted use of analogy as a tool
for thinking, we identify six different types of uses. The second level con-
cerns the reºexive discussions by the actors themselves on the nature and
limitations of analogical thinking in science. As we will see, this reºexive
turn on an otherwise spontaneous use of analogy in scientiªc practice is
relatively rare in the pages of the PT.
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2. Corpus and Method
In this study, we focus our attention on the PT from the ªrst issue in 1665
to approximately 1780. The choice of this source, as a good representative
of the practices and results of scientiªc inquiries is based on the fact that:
(1) The PT is published on an almost continuous basis and covers all kinds
of sciences. During the chosen period, it publishes papers that would now
fall into the modern categories of physics, biology, medicine, chemistry,
linguistics, economy, astronomy, mathematics, architecture, geology, and
engineering. (2) Even if most contributions come from the United King-
dom and Ireland, many contributions are written by notable continental
and American natural philosophers like Leeuwenhoek or Banister. (3) Im-
portant papers or lectures appearing ªrst on the continent were often pub-
lished in translation or reviewed in the PT. For example, extracts of Le
Journal des Sçavans or lectures at the Académie Royale des Sciences were trans-
lated. (4) The PT publishes reviews of English and foreign scientiªc
books. For example, a substantial review of Christian Huygens book
Cosmotheoros was published. For all those reasons, the PT seems to provide
a very good sample of the whole spectrum of inquiries into nature for the
period.
Even if the PT papers are in general representative of the natural phi-
losophy of the period, they can nevertheless have a speciªc style that could
possibly introduce a systematic distortion in our analysis. For example,
the evidential form that many papers take in the PT could be speciªc to
the Royal Society’s empiricism (Dear 1985; Licoppe 1996). In the context
of this research we believe this worry to be unfounded for two reasons.
(1) Though it is true that the PT publishes less mathematical formula and
theoretical explanations than the Mémoires de l’Académie Royale des Sciences
or the Journal des Sçavans, the general content of the papers do not differ
much from homologous publications (Gross et al 2000). (2) What we pro-
pose is a taxonomy of the types of uses. For this analysis we think that the
PT provides a representative sample of papers covering all the possible
types of analogy even if the actual distribution of the different kinds of
uses could differ from journal to journal, due to local traditions. When the
Journal des Sçavans will be available in full text like PT, we could compare
the results for the two journals, something that is not possible at this
time. One could also think that the distribution of topics in the PT makes
it more probable that some types of analogies will be used to the detri-
ment of others. But again, only further studies can show that. Here we of-
fer a ªrst analysis of a large corpus of texts using explicit analogical rea-
soning, thus going well beyond the usual focus on a few major thinkers.
As for the method employed in this study, we systematically looked for
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occurrences of the string of letters “analog*” in the full text version of
the PT available on JSTOR.2 This technique allows us to identify self-
conscious uses of analogy. It is of course possible to use analogies without
using the word and simply say for example that one “compares x to y” or
that “x is like y.” Though our method obviously misses all these cases, we
think that by picking all the explicit uses of the concept of analogy we can
get a large enough sample to have access to all the spectrum of uses.3 We
see no reason to think that the implicit uses would have a different struc-
ture than the explicit ones. And even with this possible limitation, our ap-
proach is certainly more general than the usual concentration on major ac-
tors. We stop our analysis around 1780 because we think that by that time
the different types of uses have been identiªed. Moreover, the progressive
rise in the use of analogies observed after 1780 suggests a change of re-
gime in scientiªc argumentation. Figure 1 shows that, for the period
1665–1780, the words “analog*” were present in about 6% of the papers
and reviews. However, after 1780 there is a rapid increase in frequency
though no new type of use emerges at least before the middle of the 19th
century when mathematical analogies will become more frequent in phys-
ics. Though this period falls outside the scope of this paper, we think the
rise in the uses of analogies maybe related to the progressive disappearance
of the stigma associated with the use of analogy in occult researches still
present during the 17th century. By 1780 occult sciences are no longer a
legitimate reference and one could probably use analogies without the
danger of being attacked for invoking occult qualities or making ontolog-
ical connections between different orders of things. By comparison, for the
decade 1991–2000, around 36% of papers in PT contain at least once the
word analog*, a proportion similar to that obtained during the 19th cen-
tury. Note that during the period 1665–1780 only about half of the pa-
pers contain illustrations like images of natural objects or geometrical
ªgures. Though one could use illustrations to make analogies, this is not
the case here, as they serve to illustrate directly the object under study or
they are mathematical ªgures helping in the demonstrations. Therefore
we do not analyse the ªgure as such and concentrate on the texts where an-
alogical arguments are developed.
So by choosing to concentrate on the PT from 1665 to 1780 we can:
(1) get a representative characterization of the early uses of analogy;
(2) capture these uses for a signiªcant period of time when the sciences
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2. In this paper “analog*” represents the group of words: “analogy”, “analogical”, “ana-
logically”, etc.
3. As we expected, the analysis of a sample of papers in the PT using the expressions “is
like” and “compare(s)” did not show new kinds of use of analogy. Moreover, these expres-
sions are often used in conjunction with the term “analogy” itself.
were not yet well-deªned disciplines, and where the actors (natural philos-
ophers) were not yet “scientists” trained in a more homogenous and spe-
cialized manner.
3. The Meanings of “Analogy”
Before analysing the content of the PT papers, we will ªrst look at the
deªnition of analogy provided by the major dictionaries of the times in or-
der to see if its meaning has signiªcantly changed over the period studied.
Unsurprisingly for such an abstract word, all dictionaries do not give
identical deªnitions. However they tend to refer to two basic concepts:
proportionality and similarity. In the ªrst case analogy is deªned as an
equality of ratios, which corresponds to the ªrst meaning of the Greek
term “analogy.” The second one is more informal and refers to the fact that
two objects are similar to each other under some aspect. Thus Cockeram’s
deªnition is: “Analogie, Proportion, likenesse of one thing to another”
(Cockeram 1650). Moreover these two forms have been associated with
different disciplines. A century after Cockeram, Paulian, in his Diction-
naire de physique portatif, explicitly ascribed the proportionality form to
mathematics and the similarity form to physics (Paulian 1767, p. 27).
Looking at previous publications, this attribution seems often shared.
Also, in apparent continuation with these early uses, some authors sug-
gest that if two objects are analogous, then an ontological relation is con-
necting them. In a certain sense they belong to the same category (Anony-
mous 1657). This suggests that the identiªcation of an analogy can be, in
certain circumstances, scientiªcally signiªcant. It could go beyond the
subjective perception of resemblance. For example, in his Physical Dictio-
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Figure 1. Proportion of documents in PT where analog* is used.
nary, Blancard proposes the following deªnitions: “Analogia, see Analog-
ismus. Analogismus, a comparison and perception of causes that help by
likeness” (Blancard 1693, p. 10). Through the perception of likeness we
are in a better position to perceive and compare causes (see also Coles
1677). To produce an analogy can thus serve as an explanation because be-
hind the similarity lies an eventual causal order (Johnson 1755). Others
insist on the epistemological aspect of scientiªc analogies. Analogical rea-
soning is a scientiªc tool, because a hypothesis is more probable (or at least
looks more probable) if we can produce similar cases. In this context, rea-
soning by analogy is a kind of induction founded on the uniformity of na-
ture (Chambers 1728; Diderot and d’Alembert 1751, pp. 399–400). This
uniformity of nature is also the justiªcation of the ontological implica-
tions of analogy. By the end of the studied period all these aspects of the
analogy concept were described in authoritative works like the ªrst edi-
tion of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (Society of Gentlemen 1771, p. 142).
It should be noted that this diversity of meanings for “analogy” is not
strictly an English phenomenon. In its ªrst edition, Le dictionnaire de
l’Académie Française deªnes “analogie” as: ratio, resemblance, conformity,
proportion of one thing to another (Académie française 1694, p. 38). In
the second edition of the dictionary “analogie” is now limited to its math-
ematical meaning: ratio, proportion (Académie française 1718). However in
the fourth edition both aspects, proportionality and similarity, are present
but in two distinct deªnitions (Académie française 1762, pp. 69–70). The
range of deªnitions also increased during the period studied. For example
in 1694, only “analogie” and “analogique” were given deªnitions. In
1718, deªnitions were also provided for “analogue” and “analogique-
ment.” This probably reºects an increasing use of these terms but may also
denote an increased institutional approval of the use of analogies. This
brief survey of the major dictionaries thus conªrms that the meaning
of analogy has not radically changed during the 17th and the 18th
centuries4.
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4. To conªrm that the meaning given to “analogy” did not differ signiªcantly in Eng-
lish and in French, we also looked at some English translations of French papers using the
word “analogy” in the Journal des scavans to see how that word was rendered in English. In
the three chosen papers (Anonymous 1666b, 1666c; Cassini 1677a, 1677b; Cassini 1686a,
1686b) analog* appears ªve times: twice “analogous” is the translation of “analogue,”
twice “analogy” is used to translate “analogie,” and once the expression “analogy and uni-
formity” is used to translate “harmonie.” Moreover our corpus contains four bilingual
French-English papers (Dicquemare & Maty 1774; Dicquemare 1775; Dicquemare 1777;
Le Cerf and Mahon 1778). In these papers “analogie” is translated six times as “analogy”
and once as “similarity”; “analogue” is translated one time as “analogous” and one time is
not translated in the English version. Even if our survey is not exhaustive we are conªdent
4. Types of Uses
Between 1665 and 1780, 358 documents (articles, review, letters) con-
taining at least one word of the analog* family appeared in the PT.5 If we
use actual deªnitions of disciplines, the discipline most represented in our
corpus is by far the duo biology-medicine, followed by astronomy-physics,
and then by mathematics. Other research ªelds, like geology and chemis-
try, are represented only to a limited extent. We propose in this section a
classiªcation of the uses of analogy that focus on their meaning and func-
tion. We divide these uses in two broad categories: reºexive and practical
uses. The occurrence of the word analog* is taken as reºexive when its use
itself is discussed. On the other hand, when the use of analogy is taken for
granted, when its limits, meaning or validity are not explicitly discussed,
the occurrence is classiªed as practical. Practical uses are divided into six
categories. An analogy can refer to (1) a general scientiªc principle or
(2) to a concrete model; it can (3) illustrate or clarify an argument, (4) ref-
er to a proportionality relation or (5) serve as a basis for a classiªcation.
Finally, an analogy can (6) be used to propose and justify a prediction. The
following sections will discuss these different types in turn and the con-
clusion will compare our classiªcation scheme based on the spontaneous
uses of analogies by practitioners with other uses constructed by philoso-
phers based on a priori epistemological considerations.
4.1 Reºexive Uses of Analogy
In the chosen corpus the use of speciªc analogies is the norm. What is far
less frequent (around 4% of the documents containing analog*) are ex-
plicit comments on the use of analogy itself in science. Most of these are
warnings about the unreliability of reasoning by analogy. For example, the
opinion of the physician Caspari Bartholini is approvingly reported: anat-
omists of the past have neglected “to consult Nature herself, and acquiesce
in nothing but Experiment” (Anonymous 1676, p. 768). They relied too
much on analogies based on “light observation of a few circumstances”
(p. 769). Analogy, even if it can be used, is in general a bad alternative to
direct observation and experimentation. The use and abuse of analogy
should not surprise us. According to Tubervill Needham (1748), we have
a propensity to infer by analogy. He argues that:
The Method of Reasoning by Analogy is but too apt to lead us into
Mistakes, and therefore we ought to be very difªdent of conse-
160 The Uses of Analogies
that the English and French uses of words like “analogy” and “analogous” cover the same
semantic ªeld.
5. In the chosen corpus the terms analog* appear 615 times. In most documents (66%),
the term occurs only once.
quences deduced this Way. Every new Appearance that has no
known Cause, immediately ªxes, and but to often at last puts the
Thoughts of the Observer upon the Rack. When the Mind arrives
at this Intensity of Action, how natural is it to free ourselves from a
painful Uncertainty at any rate, and that with as little Expense of
Reºection as may be? The most obvious and easy Method is to
class, if it admits it, and to reduce it to some other known Phenome-
na. (p. 617)
The singularity of the unknown is thus diminished by the use of an anal-
ogy, but without a careful investigation this satisfaction rests, Needham
argues, on a self-deception.
It could seem paradoxical that their mistrust of the reasoning by anal-
ogy did not stop Needham or Bartholini from using them. Indeed we do
not ªnd in the chosen corpus a general critique of the uses of analogy. In
other words, the problem cannot be the use of reasoning by analogy in
general, but its use as a means of demonstration above its heuristic value.
Limited heuristic uses are perfectly acceptable. In order to establish a
causal relation between a state of the intestine and a speciªc disease, St.
André (1717) asserts that the symptoms should be compared to symptoms
of other diseases “by Analogy of the Parts, Reason and repeated Experi-
ence” (p. 581). In a ªeld where causal relations are difªcult to demon-
strate, analogy can be used in a complementary way with Reason and Ex-
periment. Another example can be found in Horsley (1775). He asserts
that the hypothesis about the Moon’s inºuence upon the changes of
weather is highly improbable because it is “so destitute of all foundation
in physical theory, so little supported by any plausible analogy” (p. 178).
Horsley implicitly refers to a sort of principle of analogy, which asserts
that a hypothesis is more probable if you present one or more similar
cases.6 The fact that Horsley insists that the analogy needs to be “plausi-
ble” implies that not all analogies will do. One that is at least compatible
with the “physical theory” is probably required, though the author is not
speciªc on that point.
However, in the corpus studied here, the heuristic value of analogy is
not acknowledged explicitly by many authors and seems taken for
granted. We would look in vain for an opinion as clear as Joseph Priesley’s
for whom analogy “is the great key to unlock the secrets of nature”
(Priesley 1781, p. 259). It is possible that a strong praise of reasoning by
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6. A modern example of such a principle of analogy can be found in (Carnap 1963,
p. 225): “the probability that an object b has a certain property, is increased by the infor-
mation that one or more other objects, which are similar to b in other respects, have this
property.”
analogy would have been considered as giving ammunition to the adepts
of occult sciences. As argued by Vickers (1984), the occult and the
scientiªc mentalities did not disagree about the usefulness of analogy. The
contested point was that the occult tradition collapses analogy to identity
thus making analogy a metaphysical principle. Most natural philosophers
were against that position. One thing is clear though: most uses of anal-
ogy are found at the practical level where it is taken for granted as a valid
way of thinking which does not have to be explicitly justiªed.
4.2 Analogy as a General Scientiªc Principle
A ªrst type of practical use found in our corpus of texts is one that has now
become obsolete and foreign to the modern way of scientiªc thinking. In
contemporary scientiªc discourse scientists do not use the word “analogy”
to refer to a general principle of uniformity of nature. Until at least the
second half of the 18th century however, we ªnd references to a principle
of “analogy of nature.” It is worth noting however that the number of oc-
currences in the corpus where the word “analogy” seems to refer to a
uniªcation principle is very small (around 3% of documents containing
analog*).
Our ªrst example is provided by Giovanni Domenico Cassini (1686b,
p. 85) who, after exposing new discoveries about Saturn’s satellites, and in
particular the fact that all satellites (except the ªrst which is closest to the
planet) perform their revolutions in less time than Jupiter’s satellites com-
pared in their order from the planet, concludes from these discoveries that
“the admirable Analogy and Uniformity of the parts of the Universe are
most evident, and the Inªnite Wisdome and Power of the Creator is dem-
onstrated to the Contemplative.” By his use of “Analogy,” Cassini refers to
a principle of cosmic order or harmony. This order can be understood on
the basis of two principles: (1) a nomological principle: the same physical
laws are equally valid in every parts of the universe. In particular, satellites
of different planets are subject to the same laws. (2) A similarity principle:
the different parts of the universe are furnished in an equivalent or at least
structurally similar way.7 Based on these two principles we are justiªed in
applying what we know about “here” to what we do not know about “over
there.” It is useful to distinguish the two principles rather than to amal-
gamate them in a single principle of uniformity of nature’s action. The
other planets could be ontologically similar to Earth but not obey exactly
the same laws. On the other hand, other planetary systems could be fur-
nished in a different way, because of their origins, but obey the same phys-
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7. In a deterministic world if the ªrst principle holds the second principle implies a
similarity of initial conditions in the different parts of the universe.
ical laws as our solar system. Both principles are implied by the use of
“Analogy.” In the above example, Cassini is not reasoning by analogy to
explain or predict something. Rather, he is asserting the uniformity and
uniªcation of nature in the celestial realm. In the same way Thomas
Molyneux (1697), observing similarities between the animal and the vege-
tal realms, notes the “Analogy that Nature observes in casting the Horns
of Beasts and dropping the Fruits of Trees” (p. 495). This Analogy is
strengthening the nomological principle that Nature is using the same
mechanisms in different contexts.
Another well known natural philosopher, Edmond Halley uses a
slightly different expression to name a similar principle. Speaking of pos-
sible discrepancies between actual measures and his map of “variations of
the magnetical compass,” Halley (1714, pp. 166–67) writes: “‘Tis true,
that I never observed my self in those parts; and ‘tis from the Accounts of
others, and the Analogy of the Whole, that in such Cases I was forc’d to
supply what was wanting; and ‘tis possible that there may be more Varia-
tion on the Coast than I have allowed.” Halley invokes “the Analogy of the
Whole” to justify interpolations between compass measures. Thus, this
expression seems to refer to a principle of regularity implying smooth
variations of physical magnitudes in appropriate circumstances.8 This
principle is closely connected to Cassini’s, but it is a different one. In fact,
we can imagine using Halley’s principle to, at least partly, justify Cassini’s
principles, since the absence of sharp variation of physical properties is a
requisite for the possibility of uniformity principles.
Two interesting occurrences can be found in Alexander Stuart’s lectures
on muscular motion. The ªrst case is a justiªcation of inductive infer-
ences. “And therefore a few experiments clearly explained, and supported
by the analogy of nature (which in all its operations is constantly similar
to itself ) are sufªcient for the purpose of a demonstration a posteriori, or
from the effect to the cause” (Stuart 1738, pp. v–vi). In this context, Stu-
art’s principle seems to be equivalent to the fusion of Cassini’s nomolog-
ical principle and Halley’s regularity principle. Stuart also supports an on-
tological principle since he invokes “an universal analogy in the structure
of all the moving parts in the animal oeconomy, visible in the heart, lungs,
stomach, intestines, urinary bladder” (Stuart 1738, p. xl). In consequence,
at least in the restrictive domain of animal anatomy and physiology, an
ontological equivalence principle is sustained. By 1747 the principle is
even stronger. Emanuel Mendez Da Costa, discussing Belemnites fossils,
writes:
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8. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility that some phenomena are discrete.
Nature bears an Analogy through all her Works; and though all the
Species of any one Genus is not known to any Man, yet that Anal-
ogy nevertheless capacitates us to judge of those undiscover’d by
those we know. (p. 400)
The space of possible species in one Genus is sufªciently structured and
varies in a sufªciently smooth way that we can infer properties of un-
known species based on already discovered species.
It is signiªcant to note that a similar use of the word “analogy” appears
in the 1713 edition of the Principia: “Certainly idle fancies ought not to be
fabricated recklessly against the evidence of experiments, nor should
we depart from the analogy of nature, since nature is always simple and
ever consonant with itself” (Newton 1999, p. 795). About this passage,
McGuire (1970) argues that here Newton uses the expression “analogy of
nature” to refer to an ontological uniªcation principle. It allows Newton
to assert that from observable phenomena we can legitimately infer prop-
erties of unobservable entities like atoms. Where Cassini was unifying
parts of the celestial realms, Newton is relating different scales in the
chain of beings.
All these principles, which are conªrmed by observations and experi-
ments, are used to justify general conclusions based on a limited set of
data. Here analogy plays on two levels. (1) Analogous, or more precisely
similar, observations and experiments are invoked to justify a general the-
oretical framework, like the mechanical framework (this is, in part, what
Cassini and Molyneux are arguing). (2) Once the framework is assumed,
the included scientiªc principles allow the natural philosophers to inter-
pret the newly encountered phenomenon as part of an analogous class (this
is, in part, what Halley, Stuart and Mendez Da Costa are doing).9 In our
corpus, we mostly see cases where analogies are expression of a commit-
ment to the given framework (level 2).
4.3 Analogies as Concrete Models
In order to represent a phenomenon it is not uncommon to resort to a con-
crete object (a model). The cases discussed here are all examples where the
model is said to be analogous to the phenomenon under study. In fact, it is
because they are analogous that they represent. Let us see some examples.
In a paper published in 1704 in the PT van Leeuwenhoek, the well
known natural philosopher, explains how he built a model of a whale’s
crystalline lens and exactly how this model represents:
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9. A similar point is defended by Dorolle (1949, pp. 161–165).
Now, in order to have a clearer Idea of the Course of the Fibrous
Matter in the Cristaline Humor of a Whale’s Eye, which Fibres, as I
have said before, lye in so many folds upon each other, I took a
common Ball (for I could not make the Painter comprehend in any
other way) and divided it into such parts as were analogous, or cor-
responded with the Divisions of the Fibrous Matter in the
Cristallin Humor, and then wound it about with a single small
Thread, which was to represent the Fibrous Matter that compos’d a
small Scale of the said Humor. (van Leeuwenhoek 1704, pp. 1726–
1727)
The analogous model represents a whale’s eye not because they share sub-
stantive properties (for example the model is not transparent), but rather
because they exhibit a similar structure. Fibres in a whale’s crystalline lens
and the ball’s parts in the model are organised in a similar way. It is a
usual feature of modelling that only a selected set of properties are repre-
sented. In this case the ones that support the analogous relation. If models
are essentially concrete objects in the corpus, some examples show the way
toward abstract modelling. In his discussion of Malpighius’ Philosophi et
Medici Boniensis, the anonymous reviewer writes:
This Zootomy he shews to be serviceable to Physick; those Parts that
are not so discoverable in one Animal, being more evident in an-
other; and tho’ possibly they may differ something in the Figura-
tion, yet they are Analogically reducible to the same Machine: Of
this he gives several Instances in the Structure of the Lungs, Brain,
Eyes, the use of the Gall, Circulation of the Blood, Etc. which are
more visible in one Animal than another. (1697, p. 557)
Under one genus, animal structures are analogical to the same machine.
Therefore this imagined machine is a model for all animals under the same
genus. This machine is not strictly speaking a concrete object but could,
at least theoretically, be built. The concept of machine is not a pure meta-
phor here.
The next example is more complex because the model does not simply
represent a phenomenon, but also explains it:
Suppose a vessel full of water, having any thing lying at the bot-
tom, such as a shilling, the water being at rest; you will perceive
the image of the shilling distinctly; but if you give any commotion
to the water, the image of the shilling will then appear indistinct
and confused. Somewhat analogous to this is this other appearance:
If you look thro’ a telescope at any of the planets, when the stars
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appear hazy, dim, and languid, you will see them distinctly: but
look at them again, when the stars appear most bright and spar-
kling, you will then ªnd their images less distinct. (Short 1753,
pp. 365–366)
The explanation for indistinct planet observation that James Short pro-
poses can be broken down into two moments: (1) there is a similarity of
appearances between seeing an object through water and observing a
planet through the sky. (2) If hazy observations in water are caused by the
agitation of the medium then, hazy planet observations are analogically
caused by air commotion. The model explains the phenomenon. However,
the correspondence between the model and what he wants to explain is
not straightforward. It is probably for this reason that Short uses the ex-
pression “somewhat analogous.” The optical properties of water are suf-
ªciently different from air that an argument is needed to justify the
model. Short argues that an “inªnite number of heterogeneous particles”
continually ºoat in the air (p. 366). At least in part, it is the movement of
these particles that is analogous to water movement. The enormous quan-
tity of air that light has to cross to get to the telescope makes the analogy
with the small vessel of water plausible. The difference in the optical
properties of the medium is compensated by the difference of quantity of
that medium crossed by light in both cases. For the explanation to work,
Short thus presumes that the optical properties of water and air  parti-
cles are similar in appropriate conditions. The Short case is a paradigmatic
case where from analogous appearances one induces, on a probabilistic ba-
sis, analogous causal relations. We will return to this type of inference be-
low when discussing the last type of analogy.
Another way to use analogical models is possible when a model is be-
lieved to represent adequately scientiªcally relevant features of a phenom-
enon. In such a case, it is possible to learn something about the phenome-
non represented by studying the model. The surgeon Benjamin Gooch
(1775) proposed to do experiments on animals to obtain useful knowledge
to treat aneurysms in the thigh of humans:
I communicated my thoughts upon this subject to some of my
brethren, wishing to have experiments made upon brutes, that
might ascertain as far as possible, by analogy, a matter which ap-
peared to us of great importance. (p. 380)
By practicing different surgical procedures on animals, he hoped to de-
velop, by analogy, the best way to proceed on humans. The epistemolog-
ical strategy of Gooch can be reconstructed using the steps developed by
Hughes (1997): (a) Denotation: the phenomenon (human aneurysm) is
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represented by a model (induced aneurysms in animal thigh); (b) Demon-
stration: a surgical procedure is developed by working on the model;
(c) Interpretation: what has been learned about the model is transposed to
the phenomenon under study. The conªdence in the developed surgical
procedure comes from the belief that the animal aneurysms are identical
in most relevant ways to human aneurysms. Nevertheless in this context
animal aneurysms are not strictly identical to human aneurysms. We are
justiªed in using the term “model” because we do not know if induced
aneurysms have exactly the same relevant properties as naturally occurring
aneurysms.
The desire to construct models more accessible to experimentation did
not stop with animal models. Some natural philosophers, like the Abbé
Mazeas are even more ambitious:
The nature of the vapours, which compose thunder, is not abso-
lutely unknown to us. Would not the mixture of salts, sulphur, py-
rites, Etc. produce vapours capable to electrifying a bar of iron? By
suspending a bar of iron upon silken cords, and causing a wire to
descend into a large glass recipient, wherein pyrites and other anal-
ogous matters, as sea-salt with oil of vitriol, may be made to fer-
ment, in order to produce a vapour, which would contain spirit of
salt, or which might develop the electrical matter; might not we
come to produce the same phenomenon with that produced in a
storm? (Mazeas & Parsons 1752, p. 538)
To have at our disposition an artiªcial cloud able to produce electrical phe-
nomena would be an enormous advantage for the development of electri-
cal science, even if the chemical composition of the artiªcial cloud is only
analogous to the real ones.
By making an analogy between a not well understood phenomenon and
a better known or more accessible concrete model, many things can be
achieved. The model can represent, explain, or even demonstrate some as-
pects of the phenomenon under study. This seems possible because the
analogy relates structurally similar aspects in the model and in the phe-
nomenon.
4.4 Analogies as Illustrations
In the previous section we have shown cases where an analogous object
serves as a model of a phenomenon. Typically, a model goes beyond a sim-
ple representation because it allows demonstration. It can be studied in or-
der to learn something new about the thing represented. An analogous ob-
ject can also superªcially represent a phenomenon. If this representation
does not go beyond mere appearances, it is not a full ºedged model, but
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simply an illustration. In our corpus, such analogies are mainly used to
clarify or explain a particular point in an argument. The distinction be-
tween analogies as concrete model and analogies as illustration is not clear
cut. Both are analogies understood as representation tools. An illustrative
analogy could at a later time become a model. The reverse is also possible
but much less likely.
For example, Gould writes about a polypus found in the heart of a per-
son:
[T]he Fibres of the blood not being sufªciently sustain’d and kept
asunder by a due motion of the intercepted ºuid parts, may either
barely upon the account by Rest cling together, or else may be by
degrees connected so an austere astringent acid (always to be found in
cachectical Bodies) for the same reason as (an analogous liquor) milk
is curled, only with the difference that in this, the coagulation is
brittle, [. . .] where it may be very tough in blood. (Gould 1684,
p. 548)
In this passage blood is compared to milk but only in a superªcial way. In-
deed, milk, like blood, curdles, but in a different way. There could be a
similar cause involved (“austere astringent”) in both liquid but this is not
strongly argued. Milk (“an analogous liquor”) is essentially invoked to il-
lustrate the coagulation of blood. However, if the causal process of coagu-
lation was proven to be the same in blood and milk the analogy would
change status.
The physician Andrew Cantwell (1737), when describing a tumour he
found during an autopsy, uses an analogy: “At ªrst Sight I took it for a Pa-
renchyma, but, upon Dissection, found it analogous to the Liver in Sub-
stance, Colour and Consistence” (p. 141). The tumour’s interior looks like
a liver but has nothing to do with the patient’s actual liver or its function.
The liver analogy is strictly illustrative.
In a paper about cartilages’ diseases, the surgeon William Hunter com-
pares the texture of cartilage to a pile of velvet. To help the reader visual-
ize cartilage he also writes:
If another Comparison was necessary, we might instance the Flower
of any corymbiferous Plant, where the Flosculi and Stamina repre-
sent the little Bundles of cartilaginous Fibres; and the Calyx, upon
which they are planted, bears Analogy to the Bone. (1743, p. 116)
In this passage Hunter is not proposing that a certain kind of plant could
serve as model for the cartilage/bone structure but rather is using the
plant as a support for the imagination.
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Another similar example can be found in the review of McLaurin’s Trea-
tise of Fluxions (Anonymous 1743, p. 326):
[A] Proposition is demonstrated, and rendered more general, con-
cerning the Area of the Spiral that is generated on a spherical Sur-
face by the Composition of Two uniform motions analogous to
those by which a Spiral of Archimedes is described on a Plane.
The spiral of Archimedes is put forward to illustrate McLaurin’s result
about spherical surface. The assumed known result on a plane helps to il-
lustrate the new result on a spherical surface. In the text, the analogy is
not used in a formal way. If a common framework relates these two geo-
metrical settings, it is not discussed, as if the author did not want to de-
velop a full analogy between the two cases but simply illustrate a particu-
lar point.
Our next example comes from an abstract of Charles Bonnet’s Some new
observations upon insects published in the PT. In this paper, Bonnet describes
a distemper that affects worms. “I have further observed, that they are
subject also to a sort of Distemper, analogous to the Gangrene, that some-
times rots off considerable Parts of their Body” (Bonnet 1743, p. 485).
This worm disease is analogous to gangrene because it appears to act on
the body in a similar way. Nothing in Bonnet’s analysis suggests that both
diseases have the same cause or a similar cure. Their symptoms just look
the same. This analogy is thus illustrative. It helps the reader to under-
stand the action on worm of this speciªc disease.
As we have said, the distinction between a model and an illustrative
analogy is not always easy to make on the sole basis of the textual evi-
dence. Our last example comes from an anatomical study of a rattle-snake:
The Structure of the Parts and its Distance from the Fang make it
unlikely to be design’d for separating the poisonous Fluid, but rather
a Saliva to moisten the Aliment, in order to make it pass down the
Oesophagus with Ease, the Stomach of those Animals being but
small, and the Gullet considerably larger; not without some Anal-
ogy to the Ingluvies or Crop of Carnivorous Fowls, where the Food
stops for some time and is moistened, before it is capable of de-
scending into the Stomach. (Sloane and Randy 1728, p. 378)
The analogy plays here two roles: (1) it is an illustration helping the reader
to imagine the anatomical parts described, especially since this section of
the snake is not represented in the ªgures included in the paper. (2) It pro-
poses a model to explain the function of these parts. However, this second
role is suggested en passant and is not developed in the paper.
These illustrations are analogies in the classical sense of the term used
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by most philosophers (see for example Hesse 1966). A known object is in-
voked in order to claim something about a less known object. The relation
between the two objects is based on similarity. However, contrary to the
previous type of analogy (concrete models), these examples are not limited
to the context of scientiªc representation where the analogous model is
structurally isomorphic to the thing represented.10
4.5 Analogy as Proportion
The cases that fall into this type refer to one of the original meanings of
the Greek term “analogon”: proportionality. These analogies take the
form: A is to B as C is to D (noted A/B::C/D), where A, B, C and D are
quantiªable magnitudes. The form A/B::C/D can of course be used to ex-
press analogies that do not involve mathematical relations. The scholastic
corpus contains a multitude of such examples. However, our type is lim-
ited to quantiªable relations, since these were considered by natural phi-
losophers like Kepler and Leibniz to have a special status (Knobloch
1991). Let us see an example. The Irish physician Thomas Molyneux
(1700) discusses the size of a giant on the basis of the size of one of his
bone:
[A]ny one may make a probable conjecture at least in this matter, if
he but compute according to the dimensions of such Bones, what
must be the true size or bulk of the Man, whose Body, as is pre-
tended, when intire, was composed of parts and Limbs, analogous
or answering in a due proportion of these Remains. (p. 490)
Molyneux is proposing to compute the size of a giant using this analogy:
the size of the giant is to the size of the found bone as the size of the hu-
man is to the size of the equivalent bone. In this relation, only the size of
the giant is unknown, so the analogy can be used to compute this un-
known quantity. In this case the proportionality relation holds because gi-
ants are supposed to be structurally similar to humans.
As a means to approximate the distance of ªxed stars, John Michell
(1767) makes the hypothesis that the intrinsic brightness of stars is equal
to the intrinsic brightness of the sun. Using this hypothesis he then de-
scribes an empirical proof that conªrms the relatively gigantic distance
between ªxed stars and us. But this assumed equality of intrinsic bright-
ness does not seem probable. Many stars differ in size and colour. To solve
this difªculty, Michell defends another analogy relating whiteness and in-
trinsic or native brightness (p. 238):
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10. On the status of models compared to other kinds of scientiªc representation, see
Suppes (2002).
We ªnd however in general, that those ªres, which produce the
whitest light, are much the brightest, and that the Sun, which pro-
duces a whiter light than any ªres we commonly make, vastly ex-
ceeds them all in brightness; it is not therefore improbable, from
this general analogy, that those stars, which exceed the Sun in the
whiteness of their light, may also exceed him in their native bright-
ness; now this is the case with regard to many of them; and, on the
contrary, there are some that are of a redder colour.
In other words, the whiter a star, the intrinsically brighter it is. Note that
contrary to the last case, this analogy mixes quantities that do not refer to
the same ontological domain (brightness and whiteness). By combining
transitively this analogy and the preceding proof, Michell hopes to com-
pute the distance of ªxed stars if a reference case is known. It should be
noted that the transitivity of Michell’s inferences is guaranteed by the fact
that we are dealing with quantiªable magnitudes. If it were not the case,
the transitivity could still be valid but would have to be veriªed case by
case. As usual, the mathematical formalization allows us to deduce general
conclusions from a singular case.
This use of a proportionality relation in order to infer or predict a
quantiªable aspect of a phenomenon is also illustrated in the review of J.J
Zimmermanni’s Cometo-Scopia. Zimmermanni, using a proportional anal-
ogy, wrongly predicts the position of a comet:
Also by some other Observations communicated to him, the Comet
was the sixteenth of November in 1° degree of Libra Latitude ½ de-
grees Austral: From whence by the Analogy of its Diurnal Motion of
ªve degrees, it should have been the fourteenth of November a little
above the least Star in the left Wing of Virgo, as the ªrst term or
place of its Appearance. (Anonymous 1683 p. 270)
In spite of this failure, the anonymous reviewer does not critique Zimmer-
manni’s inference method, but rather attacks his religious interpretation
of the discrepancy in the comet’s positions.
By keeping some magnitudes ªxed, the proportional analogy collapses
in a simpler expression. For example, in “A/B::C/D”, if B and D are kept
ªxed, the relation becomes “A varies proportionally to B.” If the propor-
tionality factor is one, we have a case of covariation. A good example of
this can be found in Newton’s “Answer to some considerations upon his
doctrine of light and colors” (1672, p. 5103). In this paper Isaac Newton
afªrms: “the strict Analogy between the degrees of Refrangibility and
Colours.” Newton is not arguing a similarity of nature or function. What
is proposed is rather that these two things strictly covary. There is a bijec-
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tion between the intensity of these phenomena: colours and degrees of re-
frangibility. A corollary is that colours are indirectly quantiªable through
the bijection. This covariation is the core of the analogy and suggests a
deep physical connection between both phenomena, possibly a common
cause. Newton believes his theory of light is reinforced by the fact it in-
cludes this analogy.
Jean-Jacques Dortous de Mairan provides another example of covaria-
tion that is attributed to a common cause (his book is reviewed in Eames
1734):
May not the Spots, so often of late observed in the Surface of the
Sun, be owing to these Precipitations of the grosser Parts of the
Zodiacal Light, since there seems to be some Analogy or Correspon-
dence between the Frequency, Cessation and Returns of these Spots,
with the Cessation, Returns and Apparitions of the Zodiacal Light?
(Eames 1734, p. 256)
Since Mairan believes that the cause of zodiacal light is the solar atmo-
sphere: “the Zodiacal Light is the purer unmixed Atmosphere of the Sun”
(Eames, p. 244), the analogy between the apparition of zodiacal light and
sun spots suggests that the solar atmosphere is also the cause of the latter.
In this context, the analogy is also the sign of a deep physical connection,
here of a possible common cause.
Once covariation is understood to be a kind of analogy, the following
argument from a book review of McLaurin’s Treatise of Fluxions, is easy to
interpret:
When the Water is supposed to be supplied in a Cylinder, so as to
stand always at the same Altitude above the Oriªce, there is an
Analogy between the Acceleration of the Motion of the Water that
issues at the Oriªce, and the Acceleration of a Body that descends
by its Gravity in a Medium which resists in the duplicate Ratio of
the Velocity. (Anonymous 1743, p. 354)
The accelerations in these cases are proportional. For these accelerations to
be equal, ratios of parameters of the cylinder of water (area of the oriªce
and the base, height of the cylinder) have to be adjusted to ratios of pa-
rameters of the falling body. Hidden behind these equivalences is the as-
sertion that both systems are governed by similar equations. However,
this is never clearly stated in the paper. A more abstract approach, which
will be developed in physics during the second half of the 19th century, is
to represent different systems by the same equation (or formal structure),
without the necessity for the terms of the equation to refer to the same
magnitudes. William Thomson, in a paper published in 1842, provides
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the ªrst example of such a systematic formal analogy between two hetero-
geneous systems when he compares the equation of heat with the equation
valid for magnetism (Thomson 1872, pp. 2–14; Buchwald 1977).
It should be noted that proportional analogies are not limited, in the
corpus, to algebraic relations but can also be found in geometrical con-
texts. For example, William Brakenbridge (1759) makes numerous pro-
portional analogies based on ten geometrical ªgures included in his paper.
Some are naturally translated into an equation but not all are, though they
could be. The fact that these “geometrical analogies” can always be trans-
lated is signiªcant. It implies that proportional analogies based on geo-
metrical ªgures do not constitute a new type of analogy. It should also be
noted that when an analogy is based on a ªgure, at least one of the words
“analogy,” “analogical,” or “analogia” appears in the text.
As a last example of analogy as proportionality, let us look at one of the
rare cases where the absence of a proportional analogy can convey valuable
information. This analogy comes from an account of the several species of
inªnity by Edmond Halley (1692). In this short paper, Halley argues for
the existence of three kinds of inªnite quantities: “These three sorts of
inªnite Quantity are analogous to a Line, a Surface and Solid, and after the
same manner cannot be compared, or have no proportion to one another”
(p. 558). The fact that these kinds of inªnity are not proportional to each
other implies that they are not analogous. Therefore, the absence of anal-
ogy is signiªcant because it indicates that these inªnities are incommen-
surable in the classical sense.
To sum up, proportional analogy is mainly an equivalence of relations
among quantities. From this deªnition it seems almost inevitable that this
equivalence would be generalized to all sorts of formal relations. Once the
formal path is taken, the power of abstraction allows scientists to interpret
as an analogy all shared syntactic structures among objects or phenomena,
leading to the complex formal analogies now used, for example, in modern
physics (Gingras 2001, 2005). In very few sciences outside optics, astron-
omy, and physics being mathematized during the period studied here, did
we ªnd many examples of such formal analogies in our corpus, though it is
possible that the empirical orientation of the PT biased our sampling of
these formal analogies and that the Journal des Sçavans or the Mémoires de
l’Académie Royale des Sciences could contain more of them.
4.6 Analogy as a Tool of Classiªcation
Using analogies as a way to distribute objects into classes is by far the
most frequent case found in our corpus. It is possible to establish that a
phenomenon A is part of a category of phenomena X if an analogy be-
tween A and members of X can be empirically grounded. In this context
Perspectives on Science 173
the analogy can be understood as a classiªcation tool. It is also a means of
generalisation because the use of an analogy allows the extension of the ap-
plication domain of the category X. A similar type of analogy is described
by Dorolle (1949, Book 2, Chap. 3–4). In our corpus, analogies are used to
extend two sorts of categories: natural kinds and functional categories. A
natural kind is a category based on the common nature of phenomena.
A functional category implies that all members share a common or similar
function in their respective system.
Before going further, we want to dissipate a possible misunderstanding.
An illustrative analogy is based on common appearances. The ªrst step to
establish a classiªcatory analogy is most of the time to point to the com-
mon appearances between the compared phenomena. Are illustrative anal-
ogies a special kind of classiªcatory analogy? We do not believe so. The
ªrst aim of illustrative analogies is to notice the common appearances
pointing to the source and the target systems, since the analogy is essen-
tially used to clarify the author’s argument or discussion. For classiªcatory
analogies, by contrast, the common appearances are just one of the possi-
ble premises of the argument supporting the common nature or function
of the compared phenomena. Their speciªc objective is thus different. On
the other hand, a model analogy could lead to a classiªcatory analogy. A
model’s main function is to represent a phenomenon in order to learn
about it through studying the model. This is not the function of a
classiªcatory analogy. Nevertheless two phenomena in the same class are,
by their common nature or function, especially well suited to serve as
models for each other. It is why a model analogy could in certain circum-
stances lead to a classiªcatory analogy and vice versa. But the function of
each kind of analogy is clearly different in the scientiªc discourse. Let us
see a few examples.
In his review, William Watson (1753) summarizes the Abbé Nollet :
“[His] sixth letter to Mr. Franklin is upon the analogy of thunder with
electricity. This is a fact at present well established, as to admit of no
doubt” (p. 207). In this passage the analogy, or more precisely the com-
mon nature, between thunder and electricity is supposed to have been em-
pirically demonstrated by Benjamin Franklin. Thunder and electricity are
analogous because they both induce similar observable phenomena.
In the same vein, after describing numerous experiments involving the
mixture of two liquors, Frederick Slare (1694) proposes the following
analogy:
That the Spirit of Wine does not take ªre, seems to proceed from
the same Impediment which hinders light Oyls from coming up to
an Accension,because they are so suddenly thrown off; and there
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seems to be a great Analogy betwixt Aetherial Oyls and the Spirit
of Wine, both as to Speciªc Gravity, and as to other Properties,
Spirit of Wine seems to be a more thin and diluted Essential Oyl,
that contains some Water and more Air in its Pores, they seem to
own the same materal Cause. (p. 217)
The spirit of wine (ethanol) and the aetherial oyls differ in their properties.
However, they fall in the same chemical class because they “seem to
own the same materal Cause.” They participate in the same manner to
combustion.
More generally, if two phenomena follow the same physical laws they
are in the same scientiªc category and the experiments conªrming this
similarity are analogous:
This Experiment I take to be very Analogous to those lately made
on the seeming spontaneous Ascent of Water between Glass, Mar-
ble, and Brass Planes, as also with those made in Capillary Tubes;
since it seems to proceed from the same Principle, and subject to
the same Laws, as appears by matter of Fact. (Hauksbee 1709,
p. 262)
Since water behaves in a similar lawful way, ascending capillary tubes or a
compact ashes column, then these experiments are analogous.
Sometimes further empirical studies can generate some doubts about
the proper inclusion of a phenomenon into a given category based on anal-
ogy:
The resemblance and the analogy, which the ªgure of a cluster of
Polypi bears to the ªgure of a plant, would induce any observer, for
sometime to imagine, that the Polypi which he sees ªxed to the
branches of the cluster, do really proceed and spring from those
branches, in the same manner as the leaves, the ºowers, and the
fruit of a vegetable, spring from the branches of the same. It is nev-
ertheless the contrary of all this, that is true. The branches, com-
posing the clusters of the Polypi, spring from the Polypi which are at
their extremities. (Trembley 1747, p. 642)
Here, Abraham Trembley argues that the strong analogy of appearances
between a plant and a cluster of polyps does not automatically imply an
identity of nature. By observation and experiments, Trembley shows that
the growth of polyp differs greatly from that of plant. Polyp properties
seem more compatible with animal properties. However, Trembley is care-
ful not to conclude that polyps are of an animal nature. He prefers to wait
for more empirical information about plants and animals.
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In other cases, an analogy is not used to establish a common nature but
rather a common or similar function. For example, using an ingenious
method to dissect leaves, Frank Nicholls (1730) shows that each ªbre in a
leaf is composed of two distinct ªbres and that this separation is continued
through all the ªbres and stem of the leaf, so as to form two distinct planes
of similar ªbre networks:
Though this Duplication of the Vessels in Leaves seems to point out
an Analogy between them and the Veins and Arteries of Animals,
yet I see no probable Means of guessing which are the arterial and
which the venal Fibres. (p. 372)
For Nicholls, the discovery of the duplication of ªbres points out a possi-
ble analogy between leaf ªbres and the vascular system in animals. This
suggests a similar function. The leaf ªbre system would be responsible for
the circulation of the sap. The next research step, inspired by the analogy,
is to ªnd an empirical way to identify which network corresponds to arter-
ies and which to veins.
Another example can be found in the famous description of the
burbourethal glands (also called Cowper’s glands) by William Cowper
(1699):
The main design of Nature in framing these Glands seems to re-
spect the grand Work of Generation, which will be more evident if
we examin the Analogous Organs in other Animals [. . .] It is re-
markable we don’t ªnd these Glands in Females like those in Males,
tho’ they have something Analogous to them, which are described
in Women by De Graaf, and call’d Prostatae Mulierum. (p. 366)
By studying similar (analogous) glands in male animals, Cowper asserts
that the newly discovered glands in men share a similar function in repro-
duction. Moreover, these glands, only present in men, are analogous to fe-
male glands called “Prostatae Mulierum,” a set of glands that is now be-
lieved to refer to the Skenne’s parauthral glands. According to Cowper,
these two kinds of glands are not even located in the same relative position
in the body. They do not share the exact same function in reproduction.
However Cowper seems to assume that these female glands are the closest
functional equivalent to the new found male glands. If they do not have
the same function, they seem to possess a similar function in reproduction.
An example of argument against a certain analogy but for another one
is found in James Johnstone’s article on the ganglions of the nerves (1764).
Johnstone argues against the analogy between ganglion and muscle. Ac-
cording to him they cannot share the same function since we cannot rea-
sonably assign muscular power to ganglions. Ganglions do not have the
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required ªbre structure to act as muscles (p. 178). On the other hand, he
tries to establish an analogy between ganglions of the nerves and the
brain:
May we not then reasonably conclude, that Ganglions are the in-
struments, by which the motions of the heart and intestines are
[. . .] rendered uniformly involuntary; and that to answer this pur-
pose is their use, which they subserve by a structure unknown to
us, no less than that of the brain, though it seems not improbable
the ªrst may be analogous to the last? (p. 181)
Ganglions seem responsible for involuntary movements, the brain for the
voluntary ones. They are analogous. However, Johnstone remains careful
in his conclusions since he does not have strong evidence to support this
sharp division of tasks.
What all these examples show is that the establishment of analogies in
order to extend a classiªcation is considered a valuable and valid scientiªc
enterprise. The analogy can be a clue pointing to the fact that the two ap-
parently unrelated analogous phenomena are part of the same causal net-
work. On the epistemological side, an analogy, for example of function, al-
lows one to apply to the lesser known system patterns of explanation
developed in the context of the better known system. For example, if
ªbres in a leaf and the vascular system share the same function, then
the ªbres bring nutriments to the leaf. We could then infer, from the anal-
ogy, that there should be less nutriments in the sap when it returns to the
branch. This type of reasoning, where the analogy is used to make a pre-
diction, is the subject of the next section.
4.7 Prediction from Analogy
In current scientiªc literature, analogies are often part of what can be
called arguments from analogy. In such arguments, the analogy is used to
support a conclusion, where some properties of a target object are inferred
on the basis of analogous properties present in the source object. As is well
known, this form of inference is not generally valid in the deductive sense.
Nevertheless, it seems that a principle of analogy, like the one mentioned
above (see footnote 7), is often assumed in our corpus. It seems generally
believed that a hypothesis is more probable when one ªnds one or more
similar cases. Unfortunately, we did not ªnd in the corpus an explicit dis-
cussion relating argument from analogy and probability theory. Therefore
reasoning from analogy was in practice considered by natural philosophers
of the time an acceptable kind of inductive reasoning. Again, the point
is not to evaluate its validity from an abstract and modern philosophical
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point of view, but to describe the type of arguments from analogy natural
philosophers of the 17th and 18th century used in their papers.
In order to make an argument from analogy, the similarity between the
target phenomenon and the source must ªrst be established. In our corpus,
this is essentially done by pointing out similar observable properties be-
tween the target and the source. Once the similarity is established, one
can predict something about the target. This prediction can be an observ-
able or an unobservable property, for example a causal relation or even a
complete causal network. The conªdence that the author puts in his anal-
ogy is generally proportional to the strength of the similarity relation es-
tablished as a precondition. Let us see a few examples.
The American natural philosopher John Banister observes, in a certain
kind of snail that possesses a transparent shell, a thin spotted ªlm which
contracts and dilates itself. Based on this observation, he makes the fol-
lowing analogy about the possession of similar ªlm:
I suppose the same to be in all, at least the Land-Kind, tho’ not eas-
ily to be discerned. It is likely also, that the Film, the Nautilus or
Carvil (as the Sailors call it) exerts, may be analogous to this. (Ban-
ister 1693, p. 671)
The observed snail is a good source for the analogy because it is in the
same animal category as other land snails or the nautilus. This category is
of course established by referring to their similar observable features. In
other cases, the induced analogical property could only be observed using
scientiªc instruments. For example, based on the observed correlation be-
tween the electric conductibility and the grain of a few crystals, Benjamin
Wilson generalizes his conclusion:
Now, as several of the above gems have different electric poles inde-
pendent of their shape, and I have not yet been able to vary the di-
rection of the ºuid in any one of them, though various methods
have been tried, and some of a violent nature; and since the green
crystal, or chrysolite, above described, hath likewise the same elec-
tric poles, but with this difference only, that the ºuid moves always
along the slender threads or columns, which is the grain thereof,
and without suffering any change from that direction; it seems by
analogy, that the electric ºuid ºowing through all of them, moves
in that direction in which the grain happens to lie. (Wilson 1762,
p. 445)
We have here an ordinary case of inductive reasoning concerning the prop-
erties of crystals. That Wilson qualiªes this induction by the word “anal-
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ogy” conªrms the fact that for the actors of the period an argument from
analogy is already considered as a kind of induction.
There is something peculiar in these examples. Common properties are
inferred on the basis that objects or phenomena belong to the same cate-
gory (that they share similar observable properties). But how is a category
deªned if not by a common set of properties? So, in a sense, to infer by
analogy in this context is a way to deploy all aspects of the underlying cat-
egory. Ultimately all these cases are based implicitly on a general scientiªc
principle like the ones described above on the uniformity and analogy of
nature.
Let us now look at two examples where the predicted feature goes be-
yond an observable property. Predicting the absence of rotation of Jupi-
ter’s and Saturn’s satellites (a phenomenon that was then considered
unobservable), an author wrote in 1666:
But, as for the Secundary Planets, as well those about Jupiter, as that
about Saturn; it is most likely that they have no such Rotation
upon their Axis. Not so much, because; by reason of their small-
ness, no such thing hath been yet observed, (or, indeed, could be,
though it were true;) But because they being Analogical to our
Moon, it is most likely that they are moved in like manner. (Anony-
mous 1666a, p. 144)
The strength of this analogy is less founded on a clear category of “satel-
lite” than on the hypothesis that the same cause is producing the move-
ment of the moon and of the other satellites. In the next example the au-
thor goes further.
Thomas Molyneux wants to prove that the geological phenomenon
called the Giant Causeway, which consists of thousands of stone pillars,
has been produced by a natural cause. In order to prove this hypothesis he
invokes many similar looking phenomena which have a natural origin:
But nothing puts this more out of Dispute, than to make a little
Enquiry into other Works of Nature of the like kind; where though
perhaps we may ªnd nothing altogether the same, yet we may ob-
serve some of her Productions, that at least bear such an Analogy, or
Resemblances to the Composition and Figure Remarkable in these
Stones, that we shall easily conclude These as well as They must
certainly be the Architecture of the Regular Hand of Nature. (Foley
and Molyneux 1694, p. 177)
Molyneux’s argument involves the induction of a kind of cause. Based on
the production of many similar (but different) source phenomena to the
Giant Causeway (the target), each source phenomenon having a natural
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cause, Molyneux concludes that the target has probably a natural cause.
This argument from analogy goes beyond the induction of an observable
property. It concludes about the natural status of a causal relation.
In more complex cases, the analogy allows the projection from the
source to the target of a complete causal structure or network. Let us see
two examples. The Irish physician T. Madden (1731) discusses the poison-
ous effects of laurel-water, a drink produced by distilling water with laurel
leaves. The question that Madden proposes to answer is how does this wa-
ter affect the body? Other physicians suggest that the poison causes an
inºammation of the stomach and guts that can be fatal. Madden rejects
this hypothesis. His explanation schema is that the effects of laurel-water
are analogous to the effects occasioned by epilepsy:
I do not know any thing that will illustrate this Matter, than the
Analogy which may be observed between the Convulsions occa-
sioned by the Epilepsy, and those which are the Effect of Laurel-
Water. (p. 95)
His analogy is sustained by observable facts: the appearances (convulsions)
caused by ingestion of laurel-water look like those during an epilepsy cri-
sis and, importantly, the absence of inºammation seen during the autop-
sies of dogs that died after ingestion of laurel-water is compatible with ep-
ilepsy. Using this similarity as a foundation, Madden then projects on the
target (the effects of laurel-water) a complex causal network (how epilepsy
affects the vascular and muscle system). This analogy is then considered
the explanation of the fatal effect of drinking Laurel-Water.
Another example can be found in the book review of Christianus
Huygens’ The Celestial World Discover’d, or Conjectures concerning the Inhabit-
ants, Plants, and Productions of the Worlds in the Planets:
And tho’ it be impossible for us ever to see those Planets, by reason
of their vast Distance, yet from the Analogy that is between the
Sun and Stars, we may judge of the planetary Systems about them,
and of the Planets themselves too, which probably are like the plan-
etary Bodies about the Sun, (that is) that they have Plants and Ani-
mals, nay, and Rational ones too, as great admirers and Observers of
the Heavens as any on Earth. (Anonymous 1699, p. 337)
The analogy between the Sun and stars allows the natural philosopher to
make hypotheses about the existence of other planets, plants, and animals
that are unobservable with the available telescopes. The projection of
properties from the source to the targets implies a very complex network
of causes and objects.
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In our corpus, some natural philosophers also discuss empirically
conªrmed analogical inductions, in other words particular inferences by
analogy that were discovered as valid. For example:
The Discovery [of the rotation of Jupiter] is one of the best, that
have been yet made in the Heavens; and those, that hold the Mo-
tion of the earth, ªnd in full Analogy. For, Jupiter turning about the
Sun, does nevertheless turn about his Axis; and although he be
much bigger than the Earth, he does nevertheless turn much more
swiftly than it, since he makes more than two Turns, and a third
part, for its one, and carries with him 4 Moons, as the Earth does
one. (Anonymous 1666b, p. 173)
The empirically shown movement of Jupiter extends the properties attrib-
uted to the planet category and indirectly reinforces the principle of uni-
formity of nature. A more complete theoretical framework can also be
conªrmed by using analogies. For example, Joseph Priestley (1775) ex-
plains that:
The manner in which I have used it [air], has been to throw the fo-
cus upon the several substances I wished to examine, either in vacuo,
or when conªned by quicksilver, in vessels ªlled with that ºuid,
and standing with their mouths immersed in it. I presently found
that different substances yield very different kinds of air by this
treatment; and though the reasons, or analogies, of the different
products, in many of the cases, be sufªciently obvious, and such as I
had conjectured a priori, yet in other cases I am not a little puzzled
and surprized. (1775, p. 387)
Each new successful analogical prediction of chemical products conªrms
to Priestley the usefulness of his chemical categories and mechanisms. Un-
fortunately, every surprising result shows that further work is still needed.
It should be noted that, in the period studied, disconªrmed analogical
predictions do not falsify the principle of the analogy of nature or suggest
giving up the method of analogical induction.
5. Conclusion
Any analysis of the frequency of the uses of analogy in scientiªc papers is
probably subject to a bias introduced by the choice of the source journal.
However, a normalised measure of the relative frequency of use in different
ªelds can produce a ªrst idea on the distribution of the uses of the differ-
ent types of analogies among the various research ªelds. We have con-
structed an index of use for the seven research ªelds among which we have
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distributed the 335 documents of our corpus (with 20 attributed to an
“other” category).11 The normalized index is calculated as the ratio of the
proportion of use of a given analogy in a given ªeld to the proportion of
total papers in that ªeld. For example, to obtain the value of the index for
the case of illustrative analogies in chemistry, we divide the proportion of
papers in chemistry that use such an analogy (9/78) by the proportion of
chemistry papers in the corpus (17/335). We thus get 2,3, which means
that this analogy is used more than twice as often in chemistry as should
be expected from a uniform distribution of that use among all the ªelds.
The results are summarized in Table 1. Note that there can be more than
one type of analogy used in a given paper so that the total for the types of
use is higher than 335. When the index of use of a particular analogy in a
research ªeld is higher than one, this means an over-representation, while
an index below 1 points to an under-representation of that type of analogy
in that ªeld.
Note that the seven types of analogy are not used in the same propor-
tions. Reºexive uses, analogy as principle and analogy as model, account
for only 3% each. As much interest as been recently accorded to models in
science (Morgan and Morrisson 1999; de Chadarevian and Hopwook
2004), this relative scarcity of explicit modelling during the period stud-
ied here (1665–1780), compared to other uses of analogy suggests that
such modelling maybe relatively recent. 91% of the uses of analogy are
distributed evenly between illustration (18%), proportion (17%), and pre-
diction (22%), with classiªcatory uses being the most frequent with 32%
of the identiªed uses.12
Let us look in more detail at the four uses for which we have the best
statistics. Illustrative uses can be found in all research ªelds, though they
are clearly underrepresented in astronomy, mathematics, and geology, and
overrepresented in chemistry. This distribution can be expected since il-
lustrative analogies are obviously an appropriate communication device to
describe new discoveries, of chemical products for example, for which we
do not yet possess a shared descriptive vocabulary. Inversely the deªcit of
illustrative analogies in the case of geology, astronomy, and mathematics
is probably due to the more systematic use in these ªelds of a shared de-
scriptive vocabulary. Geology predominantly uses analogical models while
the two other ªelds, being more quantitative, use primarily proportional
182 The Uses of Analogies
11. 23 of the 358 corpus documents, most of them written in Latin, were omitted from
the analysis because we could not obtain reliable translations. Though Latin texts are thus
excluded we see no reason to expect new types of analogies to emerge only in Latin texts.
12. Note than among the 335 papers we have in fact 430 cases of analogical uses as dif-
ferent types can be used in a single paper, though as we have noted, most papers use only
one type of analogy.
T
ab
le
1.
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
re
la
ti
ve
fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s
of
us
es
of
ea
ch
ty
pe
of
an
al
og
y
by
re
se
ar
ch
ªe
ld
.
T
yp
es
of
A
na
lo
gy
A
st
ro
no
m
y
(2
4)
B
io
lo
gy
(1
43
)
C
he
m
is
tr
y
(1
7)
G
eo
lo
gy
(1
5)
M
at
he
m
at
ic
s
(4
1)
M
ed
ec
in
e
(2
4)
P
hy
si
cs
(5
1)
O
th
er
s
(2
0)
R
eº
ex
iv
e
(1
4)
0
1,
3
1,
4
0
0,
6
2
0,
9
0
P
ri
nc
ip
le
(1
1)
1,
3
1,
5
0
0
0
1,
3
1,
2
0
M
od
el
(1
3)
1,
1
0,
7
0
3,
4
0
1,
1
2
1,
3
Il
lu
st
ra
ti
on
(7
8)
0,
2
1,
3
2,
3
0,
3
0,
3
1,
4
0,
8
0,
6
P
ro
po
rt
io
n
(7
6)
2,
6
0
0
0
4,
2
0
1,
5
1,
1
C
la
ss
iª
ca
ti
on
(1
41
)
0,
3
1,
4
1
1,
7
0,
1
0,
8
0,
9
0,
6
P
re
di
ct
io
n
(9
7)
1,
3
1,
2
1
1,
4
0,
2
1,
3
0,
5
1,
4
analogies, a type negligible in other ªelds. Prediction analogies are re-
markably well distributed among the different ªelds, except in mathemat-
ics where it is not really useful and where the proportional analogies per-
form essentially the same function. Its value is also low in physics where
models are the dominant type of analogy followed by proportion, since
physics tends to be quantitative. Classiªcatory analogies are most preva-
lent in descriptive sciences like biology and geology and nearly absent in
mathematics, as could be expected. One would expect that it would be
dominant in more descriptive disciplines like biology or medicine but it is
not the case except marginally for geology. The difference between astron-
omy and physics can be understood by noting that the necessity to classify
new phenomena is relatively less frequent in astronomy than in physics,
where a large number of phenomena are not yet mathematized during the
period covered here.
We can now compare our classiªcation scheme with those obtained by
different means. For example, Holyoak and Thagard (1995, Chap. 8) clas-
sify analogies based on their distinguishable purpose: discovery, develop-
ment, evaluation, and exposition. This classiªcation is a cognitive one. In
this context, the same analogy could fall into more than one category.
Moreover, the classiªcation of a particular analogy among these categories
could require access to information that cannot be found in the scientiªc
texts. For example, perhaps Benjamin Franklin derived not only the idea
of an experiment from the analogy between thunder and electricity (an ex-
periment well documented) but also the hypothesis itself that thunder is
an electrical phenomenon. To be veriªed, this proposition would need ac-
cess to more information than we can actually ªnd in the available texts.
In a similar vein, Dorolle (1949) classiªes analogies based on their func-
tion: invention, generalization, deªnition and classiªcation, and induc-
tion. A function in this context refers to a general form of reasoning or in-
ference. Dorolle’s classiªcation is philosophical. Since we have no access to
the mind of the scientist, the study of scientiªc texts rarely provide the in-
formation needed to decide into which category a particular analogy
would fall. By contrast to these two classiªcations, which are based on
general considerations, our classiªcation is driven by the content of the
texts themselves. Our types of analogies are deªned on the basis of the ob-
served uses as they appear in the corpus studied. This text-based approach
explains why we do not have an invention or a discovery category, as the
texts do not permit such an attribution. For the same reason, we distin-
guish only two categories, classiªcation and prediction, where Dorolle sees
three: generalization, deªnition and classiªcation, and induction. In the
corpus studied here, the three Dorolle categories could not easily be dis-
tinguished. In fact, our approach does not require access to hidden infor-
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mation in order to be applicable. Though more empirical and sensitive to
changing historical practices, our approach is complementary to those of
Dorolle, Holyoak, and Thagard and others who are more philosophical.
The object of this paper was to look at the extent and nature of the uses
of analogy during the ªrst century following the so-called scientiªc revo-
lution. Using the tool provided by JSTOR we have shown that for the pe-
riod 1665–1780 the proportion of papers explicitly using the term “ana-
log” and its cognates oscillates around 6% of all the papers. Following
that period we observe an important growth of the uses of that term going
up to about one half of all papers in PT, as if the method of analogy was
the most direct way to infer knowledge about a new phenomenon. We
have also seen that arguments from analogy are used in all ªelds of knowl-
edge covered in the Philosophical Transactions and that there are many dif-
ferent types of analogical thinking which cover a large spectrum, going
from the simple illustration to modelling and making predictions of new
properties or phenomena. While illustrative analogies can convey infor-
mation, they are much less developed than analogical models that go fur-
ther into the nature of the phenomenon under study. Though they are
rarely discussed as such, the different types of use of analogy present a sort
of gradation in richness of inference from the mere illustration to the sys-
tematic analysis of the comparable aspects of the source and target in order
to infer the maximum information on the target and even predict some of
its unknown properties. Finally, analogical thinking seems so ingrained
and intrinsic to scientiªc thinking (and probably to common sense as
well) that it is most of the time taken for granted as a legitimate mode of
thinking and rarely debated as such by the practitioners in their scientiªc
papers, as shown by the scarcity (3%) of the presence of reºexive discus-
sions of analogy during the period analyzed in this paper.
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